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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES-NEW ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT RULE CONFLICTS
WITH NEW GENERAL ASSEMBLY RULE: WHICH CONTROLS? Vann v.
State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992).
I. FACTS
On Easter Sunday, March 30, 1991, a three-year-old girl was
playfully coloring Easter eggs with her baby brother and mother at the
breakfast table.1 However, when Steve Vann, the child's uncle, entered
the room, the child's face became blank and she said, "Mama, he made
me bleed.2 . . . He hurt me down here [pointing to her vaginal area] ."I
The mother looked inside the child's underwear and saw blood.4 The
mother then ran to a neighbor's house, called the police, and took the
child to the hospital.5 Upon her arrival at the emergency room of the
hospital, the child made statements to a nurse.' The child also made
statements to an investigative policeman shortly after her trip to the
hospital the morning after the alleged rape occurred.7
On April 12, 1991, the State of Arkansas charged Steve Vann
with raping his three-year-old niece.' On June 5, 1991, pursuant to the
1. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 10, Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126
(1992)(CR No. 91-191).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at II.
6. Id. at 33-34. The child related to the nurse the same version of her story that she told to
her mother. Id. at 34-36.
7. Id. at 15. The policeman was a criminal investigator with the Jonesboro Police Depart-
ment assigned the special duty of investigating allegations of sexual abuse towards children. After
the child verbalized to the policeman her version of what had occurred, the policeman had the
child illustrate the incident by placing circles, on drawings of an adult male and a small female
child, around the parts of the anatomy involved in the alleged abuse. Id. at 14-16.
8. Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 304, 831 S.W.2d 126, 127 (1992). Vann was charged with
rape under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987) which provides:
(a) A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
activity with another person:
(1) By forcible compulsion; or
(2) Who is incapable of consent because he is physically helpless; or
(3) Who is less than fourteen (14) years of age. It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this subdivision that the actor was not more than two (2) years older
than the victim.
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child hearsay exception found in Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(25)
(hereinafter "Rule 803(25)"),0 the State filed a Motion to Determine
the Admissibility of a Statement of a Child Under Ten Years of Age
Regarding an Act of Sexual Abuse.10 Shortly before Vann's trial, a
hearing was held to determine the trustworthiness of the child's state-
ments about the alleged sexual abuse to her mother, to the nurse at the
hospital, and to the investigative police officer." During the court's ex-
(b) Rape is a Class Y felony.
9. ARK. R, EvID. 803(25), codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Rule 803(25))
(Michie 1987), provides:
(25)(A) A statement made by a child under ten (10) years of age concerning any
act or offense against that child involving sexual offenses, child abuse, or incest is ad-
missible in any criminal proceeding in a court of this state, provided:
1. The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the statement offered possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthi-
ness using the following criteria:
a. the age of the child
b. the maturity of the child
c. the time of the statement
d. the content of the statement
e. the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement
f. the nature of the offense involved
g. the duration of the offense involved
h. the relationship of the child to the offender
i. the reliability of the assertion
j. the reliability-credibility of the child witness before the judge
k. the relationship or status of the child to the one offering the
statement
1. any other corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject
of the statement
m. any other factor which the court at the time and under the
circumstances deems relevant and appropriate.
2. The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable
notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement.
3. If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subdivision the court shall
instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to
be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall con-
sider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant
factors.
4. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the admission of an of-
fered statement under any other hearsay exception or applicable rule of
evidence.
10. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 1.
11. Id. at 2. Before a child's statement(s) will be admitted at trial under Rule 803(25), the
State must prove to the court, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that any
statement offered possesses a "reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness." See ARK. R. EvID.
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amination of the child at the pre-trial hearing, the child gave conflict-
ing testimony against Vann. 2 After reviewing all of the evidence on the
State's motion under Rule 803(25), the trial court found that the child
was not competent to testify.13 However, the trial court did find that
the child's statements to her mother, the nurse, and the policeman were
trustworthy and ruled that the statements could be admitted as evi-
dence in Vann's trial."' The case went to trial, and the child's state-
ments were introduced through the testimony of her mother, the hospi-
tal nurse, and the investigative policeman.1 5 On June 14, 1991,6 the
jury convicted Steve Vann of rape by sexual intercourse with a person
under the age of fourteen and sentenced him to forty years in prison.1
In his appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, Vann argued only
two points: "[t]he circuit court erred in allowing witnesses to present
[the] hearsay statements made by [the child], [and the] court erred in
not permitting defense counsel to impeach the testimony of [the
mother] regarding the [child] victim's relationship with [Vann]."'" In
order to convict Vann of rape, the State had to prove that sexual inter-
course occurred by " 'penetration, however slight, of [the victim's] va-
gina by [Vann's] penis.' ""s In reviewing the record on appeal, the Ar-
803(25)(A)(1), supra note 9.
12. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 21-24. The child stated that Vann did not hurt her
in any way and that she did not remember telling her mother anything on the morning when Vann
walked into the breakfast room. The child did remember having blood in her panties and stated
that Vann put the blood there; however, the child also stated "[m]y momma caused that to hap-
pen." The child stated that she did remember the drawings (male adult and female child), but
shook her head back and forth [indicating "no"] in response to whether or not she drew circles on
the picture. The child later responded that she put a circle on the drawings because she wanted to.
Id.
13. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127.
14. Id. Curiously, the trial court found the child's statements to the hospital nurse admissi-
ble under Rule 803(25) even though the court admitted its failure to investigate the actual facts
and circumstances concerning the child's statements to this nurse as required by the rule. Brief
and Abstract for Appellant at 26. See ARK. R. EvyD. 803(25), supra note 9.
15. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127.
16. Supplemental Abstract and Brief of Appellee at iii, Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831
S.W.2d 126 (1992) (No. CR 91-191).
17. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127. Vann was convicted of rape under ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(3) (Michie 1987). Id. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 129. See supra note 8.
18. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 3. The court stated that Vann's first point of error
involved a federal constitutional right under the Confrontation Clause. Vann, 309 Ark. at 308, 831
S.W.2d at 129. The court did not address Vann's second point of error, finding it doubtful that the
same factual situation would occur at retrial. Id. at 309-10, 831 S.W.2d at 130.
19. Vann, 309 Ark. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 129. Under ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(9)
(Michie 1987), "Sexual intercourse means penetration, however slight, of a vagina by a penis
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:143
kansas Supreme Court concluded that the only direct evidence of
penetration presented at trial was the policeman's hearsay testimony.20
The court ruled that the policeman's hearsay testimony was only ad-
missible under Rule 803(25) and, unlike the testimony of the victim's
mother and the hospital nurse, did not satisfy the requirements of any
other hearsay exception.2
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed Vann's conviction, holding
that Rule 803(25) was unconstitutional under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2" In
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright2" to determine that Arkan-
sas' child hearsay exception 2 was unconstitutional.25 The court held
that "Rule 803(25) [denied Vann] his right of confrontation since it
provide[d] that the hearsay statement of a child is admissible" after
the trial court determines that the statement possesses a "reasonable
likelihood of trustworthiness. 2 6 The court said that the proper stan-
dard of admissibility under "the Confrontation Clause requires that the
statement bear such 'adequate indicia of reliability' that 'the declar-
ant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that
the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.' ",27 Be-
20. Vann, 309 Ark. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 130. All other evidence of this element of the
offense was circumstantial. Id.
21. Id. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 129. In addition to Rule 803(25), the trial court also admit-
ted the mother's hearsay testimony under Rule 803(2) (excited utterance) and the nurse's under
Rule 803(4) (statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment). Id. Rule 803(2) defines
an excited utterance as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Rule 803(4) per-
mits the introduction into evidence of "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment . . . and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
22. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (emphasis
added).
23. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
24. Arkansas' child hearsay exception statute is codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101
(Rule 803(25)) (Michie 1987). See supra note 9.
25. Vann, 309 Ark. at 307, 831 S.W.2d at 128.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 307-08, 831 S.W.2d at 128-29.
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cause Rule 803(25)'s admissibility standard did not meet the minimum
standard required by the Confrontation Clause, the Arkansas Supreme
Court determined that the policeman's hearsay testimony was errone-
ously introduced. 8 Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126
(1992).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Two separate issues are raised in the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision in Vann. The first issue pertains to the application of the Con-
frontation Clause to the admissibility of hearsay statements against a
criminal defendant. This note traces the origins and development of the
Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Next, the relationship of these principles as applied to the Ar-
kansas child hearsay exception for sexual offenses, abuse, or incest is
discussed. The second issue pertains to the interplay between the legis-
lative and judicial branches in establishing court rules. Since both the
Arkansas Supreme Court and the general assembly have enunciated a
child hearsay exception, this note reviews the historical setting sur-
rounding the promulgation of court rules in Arkansas.
A. History of the Confrontation Clause as Interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court
The origins of the Confrontation Clause date as far back in history
as 1603.29 The right to confront adverse witnesses is guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 0 The Confronta-
tion Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."'31 In 1980, the United States Supreme Court articulated a gener-
alized approach for determining the admissibility of hearsay statements
under the -Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in Ohio v.
28. Id. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 129.
29. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970). In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh was
executed for treason. His conviction was based solely on what would be coined today as inadmissi-
ble hearsay. Id. A historical analysis of both the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
and Rule 803(25) is found in another recently published University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Law Journal casenote. See Mark D. Wolf, Note, Arkansas Child Hearsay Exception Regarding
Sexual Offenses, Abuse, Or Incest is Unconstitutional, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 579 (1992).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. Id. See supra note 22. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is made applica-
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
1992]
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Roberts."2 The Court stated that the Confrontation Clause operates in
two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay: 1) in the
usual case, the prosecution must produce the declarant for trial or
demonstrate his unavailability to the court; and 2) in cases where the
trial court finds the declarant unavailable, the State must prove that
the statements bear sufficient "indicia of reliability. 3
A literal interpretation of the Sixth Amendment appears to re-
quire that when a declarant is available for trial, the accused is guaran-
teed the right to confront the declarant face-to-face before any of the
declarant's statements may be admitted."' However, the Court in Rob-
erts found that such an interpretation would "abrogate virtually every
hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too ex-
treme.""5 Under the holding in Roberts, when a declarant is unavaila-
ble for trial, his statement's "indicia of reliability" may be inferred
without more if there is a showing of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness," or if the hearsay statement falls within a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception.36 Although the Court did not define "firmly-
rooted," it did reason that some hearsay exceptions have such intrinsic
foundations for reliability that the introduction into evidence of state-
ments pursuant to those exceptions would not violate an accused's con-
stitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him at
trial.3" Thus, in some narrow circumstances, "competing interests, if
32. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). In Roberts the United States Supreme Court indicated that
passages in an Ohio Supreme Court ruling suggested "that the opportunity to cross-examine at [a]
preliminary hearing - even absent actual cross-examination - satisfie[d]" the defendant's right
to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 70.
33. Id. at 65-66. See Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v.
Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207 (1984). In a case decided after Roberts, United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387 (1986), the Court held that the prosecution was not required, as a necessary antece-
dent to the introduction of hearsay testimony of a co-conspirator, to produce the declarant at trial
or show that the declarant is unavailable. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.
34. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62-63. See supra note 22.
35. 448 U.S. at 63. The Court has retreated from an across-the-board "unavailability" re-
quirement. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text;
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), infra note 37; United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387 (1986), supra note 33 and infra notes 64 and 70.
36. 448 U.S. at 66. See also Eleanor L. Owen, The Confrontation Clause Applied to Minor
Victims of Sexual Abuse, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1521 n.75 (1989) (discussing exceptions that
tend to insure reliability of hearsay statements in the absence of cross-examination and oath).
37. 448 U.S. at 66. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987), the Court held
that hearsay statements of a co-conspirator (FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E)) are a firmly-rooted
hearsay exception because they carry sufficient "indicia of reliability." Other firmly-rooted excep-
tions include "spontaneous declarations" (FED. R. EvID. 803(2)) and "statements made for pur-
poses of medical diagnosis" (FED. R. EvID. 803(4)). White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 n.8
[Vol. 15:143
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'closely examined,' 38 may warrant dispensing with confrontation at
trial." 9
In three subsequent decisions, Coy v. Iowa," Maryland v. Craig,41
and Idaho v. Wright,42 the United States Supreme Court examined the
(1992). See Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly-Rooted": Exceptions To the Confrontation
Clause. 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (indicating that to be "firmly-rooted," hearsay exceptions
must contain solid foundations allowing introduction of nearly any conforming evidence).
38. Roberts, 448 U. S. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
39. Id.
40. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The Court in Coy held that a screen between two child witnesses
and a criminal defendant violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront them at trial. Id.
at 1022. The Court found no applicable exceptions under the Confrontation Clause as to an ac-
cused's right to confront witnesses face-to-face, regardless of the costs to the victim. Id. at 1020.
"We leave for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist." Id. at 1021. The
Court found that although the face-to-face requirement might upset the truthful rape victim or an
abused child, it might also uncover the false accuser or show that a child was coached. Id. at
1020. "It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." Id. In a concurring opinion, two
justices felt that an exception could be allowed if it furthered an important public policy after a
case-specific finding of necessity. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J. concurring). See also Mary A. Ritter-
shaus, Note, Maryland v. Craig: Balancing the Interests of a Child Victim Against the Defend-
ant's Right to Confront His Accuser, 36 S.D. L. REV. 104, 112 (1991) (discussing O'Connor's
concurrence which essentially opened the door for future exceptions to the face-to-face require-
ment). In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the Court recognized
that "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment" is a
"compelling" government interest. Id. at 607. In Globe the Court found that the State's interest in
the well-being of a minor victim justified depriving the press and public of their constitutional
right to attend the criminal trial. Id. at 608-09. The trial court must first determine, on a case-by-
case basis, that closure of the trial to the media and public is necessary to protect the child
victim's welfare. Id. See generally Ellen Forman, Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of
Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437 (1989); Jaye P. Meyer, Note, Protecting the Child Sexual
Abuse Victim From Courtroom Trauma After Coy v. Iowa, 67 N.C. L. REV. 711 (1989).
41. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). In Craig the Court held that the use of a one-way closed circuit
television separating the child victim from the defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause
although its use must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 3169. Before allowing such a
procedure to take place, the trial court must first determine that it is necessary to protect the
welfare of the child witness who would be traumatized, not by the appearance in the courtroom,
but by the presence of the defendant. Id. With this decision, the Court affirmed the admittance of
statements of an "available" witness against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause even
though the defendant was not allowed to confront his accusers in court. Id. See B. I. Pershkow,
Note, Maryland v. Craig: A Child Witness Need Not View the Defendant During Testimony In
Child-Abuse Cases, 65 TUL. L. REV. 935 (1991). Arkansas admits videotaped deposition testi-
mony of sexually abused children under the age of 17 into evidence. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
44-203 (MIcHIE 1987). See also C. Alan Gauldin, Note, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child
Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws - Room for Improvement, 41 ARK. L. REv. 155 (1988).
42. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). In Wright the Court affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court's rever-
sal of a conviction for sexual abuse of a three-year-old child. The child was declared unavailable
as a witness, but the child's statements to a physician were admitted into evidence under the
residual hearsay exception in violation of the defendant's right of confrontation. Id. at 3145. The
Court noted that the issue of whether the prosecution must show that the child witness is unavail-
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competing interests between a criminal defendant's right to confront
witnesses under the Confrontation Clause and the State's desire to in-
troduce hearsay testimony against him. In Craig, the Court concluded
that in some cases the State's interest in an abused child victim's wel-
fare might outweigh a defendant's right to face the child in court.'3
Similarly, the Court in Wright held that the right of an accused to
confront all witnesses against him is not absolute since certain hearsay
statements might be admitted regardless of the declarant's availabil-
ity." "[I]f the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding
circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal
utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at
trial.' '5
In deciding whether or not a declarant's statements contain "par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness," the trial court's determina-
tion of admissibility must be made without using corroborative evi-
dence to support the hearsay statement."' The majority in Wright held
that only those circumstances surrounding the making of the declar-
ant's statement are relevant to the determination of trustworthiness.' 7
The Court in Wright identified four factors which are relevant to the
able for trial before the child declarant's statement(s) can be admitted was not raised. Id. at 3147.
43. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. One example where the child's welfare might outweigh a
criminal defendant's right of confrontation is protecting a child from trauma associated with testi-
fying in a child abuse case. See generally Eldonna M. Ruddock, Note, Something More Than a
Generalized Finding: The State's Interest in Protecting Child Sexual Abuse Victims in Maryland
v. Craig Outmuscles the Confrontation Clause, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 389 (1991); Marianne T.
Bayardi, Note, Balancing the Defendant's Confrontation Clause Rights with the State's Public
Policy Goal of Protecting Child Witnesses from Undue Dramatization: Arizona Law in Light of
Maryland v. Craig and Coy v. Iowa, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 1029 (1990).
44. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3145-46.
45. Id. at 3149. See Lisa M. Travis, Note, Idaho v. Wright: A Confrontation Clause Es-
cape Hatch for Defendants in Sexual Abuse Cases, 17 OHio N.U. L. REV. 693 (1991); H. Jean
Delaney, Note, Criminal Law: Admission of Child Sexual Abuse Victim's Hearsay Statements
Violated Defendant's Confrontation Rights as Statements Lacked "Particularized Guarantees of
Trustworthiness," 66 N.D. L. REV. 743 (1990).
46. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. The Court felt that the use of corroborative evidence in
determining trustworthiness would admit "presumptively unreliable statement[s] by bootstrapping
on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial." Id. Before admitting such evidence, the court
should instead find "that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility" because
of the inherent trustworthiness of the statement. Id. See Mary B. Martin, Note, Idaho v. Wright:
The Confrontation Clause's Limitation On the Use of Corroborating Evidence In the Child Abuse
Context, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 225 (1991).
47. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149. The Court noted that the "guarantees of trustworthiness"
surrounding various hearsay exceptions are based on those circumstances "that existed at the time
the statement was made and do not include those that may be added by using hindsight." Id.
(quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979)).
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question of reliability under the Confrontation Clause in child sexual
abuse cases:48 spontaneity and consistent repetition;"9 mental state of
the declarant;5 ° terminology unexpected of a child of similar age;51 and
lack of motive to fabricate."' The Court declined to adopt any
"mechanical test" for determining trustworthiness, but stated that the
"unifying principle" was that each of these four factors were relevant
to the question of whether the child declarant was telling the truth
when the statement was made.5"
The dissent in Wright5' believed the majority was incorrect in rul-
ing that corroborative evidence could not be used to decide the trust-
worthiness of a child declarant's statements. 5 "It is a matter of com-
mon sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine
whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated
by other evidence."56 Likewise, the dissent stated that if no corrobora-
tive evidence supported the child's statements, that fact should also be
considered when determining the statement's trustworthiness.57
In a more recent Supreme Court decision, White v. Illinois,58 the
Court held that a trial court does not have to make an initial finding of
the declarant's "unavailability" before admitting into evidence state-
48. Id. at 3150. The Court noted that these factors are simply illustrative and that "courts
have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors" in determining trustworthi-
ness. Id.
49. Id. (quoting State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (Ariz. 1987)).
50. Id. (quoting Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1988)).
51. Id. (quoting State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85 (Wis. 1988)).
52. Id. (quoting State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Kan. 1988)).
53. Id. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. The Court cited these cases only for
the factors stated and not to approve of each case's result.
54. The dissent was written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Blackmun. Id. at 3153.
55. Id.
56. Id. For example, the dissent noted that if the child stated that the abuser tied his wrists
or if the child had a scar on his abdomen, such physical evidence corroborating the child's state-
ments, evidence which the child could not fabricate, would tend to lend credibility to the child's
statements. Id. But see DAVID W. LouISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 418, at 143 (1980) (urging that medical evidence to corroborate allegations of child sexual
abuse should not be used to determine the reliability of statements identifying the abuser).
57. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3153-54. The dissent pointed out the fallacy of the majority's
reasoning in situations where the child's statements should be considered reliable under the cir-
cumstances of their making, but contain inaccuracies which would call into question their credibil-
ity. Id. at 3154. Under the majority's holding, the statements would still be considered reliable
under Confrontation Clause requirements despite considerable doubt about their reliability due to
the inaccuracies. Id.
58. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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ments made under the "spontaneous declaration" 59 and "medical ex-
amination"6 exceptions to the hearsay rule. 1 The Court noted that the
general approach used in Roberts62 might suggest that the Confronta-
tion Clause requires that a declarant be produced at trial or be found
unavailable before his hearsay statements can be admitted into evi-
dence.6" This suggestion was foreclosed, however, by the Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Inadi.1" Today, Roberts stands for the proposi-
tion that an unavailability analysis under the Confrontation Clause is
only necessary when the challenged hearsay statements were made in
the course of a prior judicial proceeding.65
B. Application of the Confrontation Clause to Arkansas' Child Hear-
say Exception (Ark. R. Evid. 803(25))
The origin of Arkansas' child hearsay exception began in 1985
when the Arkansas General Assembly approved legislation creating
such an exception. 6 In adopting this piece of legislation, the general
assembly noted that the increase in child abuse in Arkansas called for
the legislature to take immediate corrective action. 67 In Johnson v.
State Rule 803(25) was attacked on grounds that it violated a defend-
ant's right of confrontation.68 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that
59. See supra note 21.
60. See supra note 21.
61. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. In White the trial
court was not asked, and therefore, did not make, a finding that the child victim of sexual abuse
was unavailable to testify. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739. In affirming White's conviction, the Court
noted that "while an unavailability rule would . . . do little to improve the accuracy of factfind-
ing, it is likely to impose substantial additional burdens on the factfinding process. The prosecu-
tion would be required to repeatedly locate and keep continuously available each declarant, even
when neither the prosecution nor the defense has any interest in calling the witness to the stand."
Id. at 742.
62. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
63. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741.
64. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). In Inadi the Court stated that it rejected the notion that Roberts
established a precedent that "no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a showing of
unavailability." Id. at 392.
65. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741.
66. Act of Mar. 18, 1985, No. 405, § 1, 1985 Ark. Acts 752, 753-54 (currently codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987)).
67. Act of Mar. 18, 1985, No. 405, § 2, 1985 Ark. Acts 752, 754-55 (currently codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987)). Act 405 declared that an emergency existed and
immediate steps were needed to deter child abusers and expedite their prosecution while minimiz-
ing the trauma and distress of child victims. Id.
68. 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987). Johnson was on trial for the rape of a nine-year-
old boy. Id. at 635, 732 S.W.2d at 819. He argued on appeal that a declarant must first be found
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as long as the statements at issue bore sufficient "indicia of reliability,"
the Confrontation Clause did not require a showing of "unavailability"
of the child declarant under Rule 803(25).69 Simply because a declar-
ant's statements possess "indicia of reliability" does not mean that the
prior statements may be substituted for the declarant's live testimony if
he is available for trial.7" However, when the declarant's prior state-
ments do possess "sufficient indicia of reliability" and the declarant's
testimony at trial might differ "substantially" from his earlier out-of-
court statements, the unavailability requirement does not apply. 71
In Cogburn v. State,72 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
defendant's right of confrontation was not violated when his seven-
year-old daughter's hearsay statements concerning sexual intercourse
were admitted into evidence under Rule 803(25) because the child tes-
tified and was cross-examined at trial. 3 Unlike Johnson, Cogburn did
not argue on appeal that Ohio v. Roberts74 required that a declarant
must be "unavailable" before his out-of-court statement can be admit-
ted at trial to comply with the Confrontation Clause.75
In George v. State,76 the Arkansas Supreme Court declared Rule
803(25) unconstitutional because it violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against him.77 In
Idaho v. Wright78 the United States Supreme Court held that a trial
"unavailable" as a prerequisite to entering the declarant's hearsay testimony into evidence. Id. at
642, 732 S.W.2d at 822. The State pointed out that the declarant was available. Id.
69. Id. at 642-43, 732 S.W.2d at 823 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
Johnson's conviction was reversed on other grounds.
70. Id. at 642-43, 732 S.W.2d at 822-23. In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986),
the United States Supreme Court noted that the unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts,
applied when the witness' testimony at trial would match his prior out-of-court statement. How-
ever, when the testimony can be expected to be substantially different in court, the unavailability
requirement disappears. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395-96, 400.
71. Johnson, 292 Ark. at 644, 732 S.W.2d at 823.
72. 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987). Cogburn was decided the same day as Johnson.
See supra note 68.
73. 292 Ark. at 571, 732 S.W.2d at 811.
74. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
75. Cogburn, 292 Ark. at 572, 732 S.W.2d at 811. Another point Cogburn failed to appeal
was that the court failed to instruct the jury in accordance with Rule 803(25). Id. See ARK. R.
EvID. 803(25)(A)(3), supra note 9. Although that rule does not specify at what time during the
trial the instruction should be given, the Arkansas Supreme Court instructed the trial court to give
the instruction before the testimony is offered rather than at the end of the case. Cogburn, 292
Ark. at 572, 732 S.W.2d at 811.
76. 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991).
77. Id. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796. See supra note 22.
78. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. See supra note 22.
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court should not determine a hearsay statement's reliability by using
corroborating evidence unrelated to the circumstances surrounding the
victim at the time the statements were made.79 In George, the trial
court could have used such corroborating evidence under subsection (1)
of Rule 803(25) in determining the reliability of the child victim's
statements to her parents.80 Because Rule 803(25) allowed a judge to
rely on corroborative evidence of the crime in deciding the trustworthi-
ness of hearsay statements, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
Rule 803(25) was constitutionally defective on its face.81
On rehearing, the court modified its earlier ruling and declared
that only subparagraph (A)(1)(1) of Rule 803(25) was unconstitu-
tional.82 The. court also concluded that a trial judge could consider the
four factors enunciated in Wright8" under subparagraph (m), the
catch-all provision of Rule of 803(25)."' In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Glaze" agreed with the dissent in Idaho v. Wright,8" that cor-
roborating evidence should be used by a trial court in determining the
trustworthiness of a child declarant's statements to third parties.87 Jus-
tice Glaze stated, "[I]t is a matter of common sense for most people
79. George, 806 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796. The corroborating factors cannot merely
be related to proof of the crime, but must be related to circumstances surrounding the making of
the out-of-court statement. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149-50 (citing State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197,
204 (Wash. 1984)).
80. George, 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796. The court did not find from its examina-
tion of the record that the trial court used irrelevant corroborating evidence in determining the
statement's reliability. Id. Applying the Wright factors on its own motion, the court concluded
that the trial court correctly determined that the child's statements to her parents were trustwor-
thy. Id. Thus, to the extent the trial court used corroborating evidence under subsection (1) of Rule
803(25), the court held it harmless error. Id. Therefore, the court upheld George's conviction. Id.
81. George, 306 Ark. at 368, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
82. George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 374-D, 818 S.W.2d 951, 952 (1991). Rule
803(25)(A)(1)(1) states that a court can use "any other corroborative evidence of the act which is
the subject of the statement" in order to find that a statement offered possesses a reasonable
likelihood of trustworthiness. See ARK. R. EviD. 803(25)(A)(1), supra note 9. In denying George's
petition for rehearing, the majority concluded that the trial court had not considered any corrobo-
rative evidence of the crime in determining the trustworthiness of the child's statements to the
parents. George, 306 Ark. at 374-B, 818 S.W.2d at 952.
83. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
84. George, 306 Ark. at 374-D, 818 S.W.2d at 952. Subparagraph (m) provides that "any
other factor which the Court at the time and under the circumstances deems relevant and appro-
priate" may be used to determine the trustworthiness of a statement. See ARK. R. EVID.
803(25)(A)(1)(m), supra note 9.
85. Justices Hays and Corbin joined in the concurrence. George, 306 Ark. at 374-D, 818
S.W.2d at 952 (Glaze, J., concurring).
86. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3153 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. George, 306 Ark. at 374-D, 818 S.W.2d at 953.
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that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is
trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence." 88
In his dissent, Justice Dudley8 opined that George's petition for
rehearing should have been granted for several reasons. First, he stated
that only the Arkansas Supreme Court could promulgate rules of evi-
dence, and Rule 803(25) was never adopted by the court as a valid
evidentiary rule.9" Second, he believed that the standard for admissibil-
ity embodied in Rule 803(25) was too low because it only required a
showing of "a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness, '"1 compared to
the requirement under the Confrontation Clause that the statements
bear such "adequate indicia of reliability" that "the declarant's truth-
fulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of
cross-examination would be of marginal utility. ' 92 Since the Sixth
Amendment standard is much higher than what was required by. Rule
803(25), Justice Dudley believed that Rule 803(25) unconstitutionally
infringed on George's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.93
In order to correct the possible constitutional infirmity of Rule
803(25) in light of Idaho v. Wright94 and George v. State,95 the Arkan-
sas General Assembly amended the rule with the passage of Act 66 of
1992.9" Act -66 notwithstanding, on May 11, 1992, the Arkansas Su-
88. Id.
89. Chief Justice Holt and Justice Newbern joined in the dissent. Id. at 374-E, 818 S.W.2d
at 958 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 374-G, 818 S.W.2d at 954 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 374-I, 818 S.W.2d at 957-58 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 374-J-K, 818 S.W.2d at 956 (Dudley, J., dissenting) (quoting Idaho v. Wright,
I10 S. Ct. 3139, 3146, 3149 (1990)).
93. Id. at 374-M, 818 S.W.2d at 957-58. The dissent also argued three other points for
granting rehearing: 1) the trial court had considered the constitutionally defective subparagraph
(1) in determining the trustworthiness of the child's statements; 2) the court must follow the pre-
cedent of the United States Supreme Court and the concept of federalism when dealing with
matters relating to the United States Constitution; and 3) George was convicted solely on a wit-
ness' hearsay testimony which quoted a declarant found to be incompetent. A compelling argu-
ment can be made that if a witness is not competent to testify in court, his hearsay statements to a
third party cannot be made competent for later introduction at trial. Id. at 374-F to M, 818
S.W.2d at 954-58.
94. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
95. 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792, reh'g denied, 306 Ark. 360, 374-A, 818 S.W.2d 951
(1991).
96. Act of Mar. 20, 1992, No. 66 (to be codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-
101 (Michie Supp. 1992)). The Act provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. Rule 803(25) of Arkansas Code [§] 16-41-101 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
25 A statement made by a child under ten (10) years of age concerning any act or
offense against that child involving sexual offenses, child abuse, or incest is admissible
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preme Court adopted three new exceptions to the child hearsay rule. '
in any'criminal proceeding in a court of this state, provided:
I. The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the statement offered possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthi-
ness using the following criteria:
a. the spontaneity and consistency of repetition of the statement
by the child;
b. the mental state of the child;
c. the child's use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar
age;
d. the lack of motive by the child to fabricate the statement.
97. In re Addition to Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 309 Ark. app. (1992) (per curiam)
(Hays, J. dissenting). The first exception may be cited as ARK. R. EvID. 803(25). The Rule reads
as follows:
(25) Child Hearsay when declarant is available at trial and subject to cross-exami-
nation. A statement made by a child under the age of ten (10) years concerning any
type of sexual offense, or attempted sexual offense, with, on, or against that child,
which is inconsistent with the child's testimony and offered in a criminal proceeding,
provided:
(A) The trial court conducts a hearing outside the presence of the jury and finds
that the statement offered possesses a reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness consider-
ing the competency of the child both at the time of the out of court statement and at
the time of the testimony.
(B) The proponent of the statement gives the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
(C) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission of an offered state-
ment under any other hearsay exception or applicable rule of evidence.
The second exception may be cited as Rule 804(b)(6), and is as follows:
(6) Child Hearsay in civil cases in which the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is not applicable. A statement
made by a child under the age of ten (10) years concerning any type of sexual offense,
or attempted sexual offense, with, on, or against the child, provided:
(A) The trial court conducts a hearing outside the presence of the jury and finds
that the statement offered possesses a reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness. The trial
court may employ any factor it deems appropriate including, but not limited to those
listed below, in deciding whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy.
1. The spontaneity of the statement.
2. The lack of time to fabricate.
3. The consistency and repetition of the statement and whether the child
has recanted the statement.
4. The mental state of the child.
5. The competency of the child to testify.
6. The child's use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age.
7. The lack of a motive by the child to fabricate the statement.
8. The lack of bias by the child.
9. Whether it is an embarrassing event the child would not normally relate.
10. The credibility of the person testifying to the statement.
11. Suggestiveness created by leading questions.
12. Whether an adult with custody or control of the child may bear a
grudge against the accused offender, and may attempt to coach the child into
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The court adopted these new exceptions on the same day that it de-
cided Vann v. State.9 Interestingly, while declaring Rule 803(25) un-
constitutional in Vann, the majority made no mention of Act 66 of
1992.9 9
C. Interplay Between The Arkansas Supreme Court and General As-
sembly in Promulgating Court Rules
In the history of the American judicial system, the authority to
making false charges.
13. Corroboration of the statement by other evidence.
14. Corroboration of the alleged offense by other evidence.
(B) The proponent of the statement gives the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
(C) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission of an offered state-
ment under any other hearsay exception or applicable rule of evidence.
The third exception may be cited as Rule 804(b)(7), and is as follows:
(7) Child Hearsay in criminal cases. A statement made by a child under the age of
ten (10) years concerning any type of sexual offense against that child, where the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States is applicable, provided:
(A) The trial court conducts a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and, with
the evidentiary presumption that the statement is unreliable and inadmissible, finds that
the statement offered possesses sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness that the truth-
fulness of the child's statement is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the
test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility. The trial court may employ any
factor it deems appropriate including, but not limited to those listed below, in deciding
whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy.
I. The spontaneity of the statement.
2. The lack of time to fabricate.
3. The consistency and repetition of the statement and whether the child
has recanted the statement.
4. The mental state of the child.
5. The competency of the child to testify.
6. The child's use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age.
7. The lack of a motive by the child to fabricate the statement.
8. The lack of bias by the child.
9. Whether it is an embarrassing event the child would not normally relate.
10. The credibility of the person testifying to the statement.
II. Suggestiveness created by leading questions.
12. Whether an adult with custody or control of the child may bear a
grudge against the accused offender, and may attempt to coach the child into
making false charges.
(B) The proponent of the statement gives the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
(C) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission of an offered state-
ment under any other hearsay exception or applicable rule of evidence.
98. See Vann, 309 Ark. at 311, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Glaze, J., concurring).
99. id.
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establish court rules has been placed in both the legislative and judicial
branches of government.100 Thus, it was inevitable that disputes would
arise between these two branches in determining which branch had the
authority to promulgate court rules."0' The United States Supreme
Court's promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
provided momentum for the shift of responsibility for making court
rules from the legislative to the judicial branch:.0 2 Thereafter, many
state legislatures transferred the responsibility for establishing court
rules to their respective state supreme courts.103
The Arkansas Constitution confers upon the Arkansas Supreme
Court "a general superintending control over all inferior courts of law
and equity."'0 4 Nonetheless, the responsibility for establishing court
rules in Arkansas has shifted back and forth between the legislature
and the Arkansas Supreme Court.' 05 Few rules governing court proce-
dure existed in Arkansas in 1853.106 The Arkansas General Assembly
adopted both a criminal and civil code in 1868107 to quell the ongoing
criticism of the rigid forms of actions and pleadings imposed by com-
mon law.' 8 Even though the legislature maintained responsibility dur-
ing this period for establishing rules of procedure, it gave both the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court and the circuit courts rule-making authority in
order to "dispatch business. '"109
100. Bruce L. Dean, Comment, Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary's Power
To Promulgate Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 139, 145-46 (1988).
101. Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of
Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624-25 (1957); see also Charles A. Riedl, Ross
Essay Contest: To What Extent May Courts Under the Rulemaking Power Prescribe Rules of
Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 601 (1940).
102. Ralph C. Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (1952).
103. Dean, supra note 100, at 148.
104. ARK. CONST. art.'VIi, § 4.
105. Silas A. Harris, The Extent and Use of Rule Making Authority, 22 J. AM JUDICA-
TURE Soc'v 27, 28 (1938).
106. See generally 1853 Ark. Acts.
107. Barnhart, supra note 102, at 14.
108. Dean, supra note 100, at 146. See also JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 381 (2d ed. 1988). In 1869, Arkansas modeled its new civil code, revamping the pleadings
and forms of actions, after that of Kentucky which used the New York Field Code as its model.
See THOMAS D. CRAWFORD ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE OF ARKANSAS, p. v (1934). The new code of
procedure was entitled Code of Practice in Civil and Criminal Cases in Arkansas. See ARKANSAS
CIVIL CODE (1869).
109. Harris, supra note 105, at 28; see also POPE'S DIGEST OF ARK. STATUTES ch. 41 §§
2777 & 2859 (1937). This power had been exercised by the courts before these statutes were
enacted. Harris, supra note 105, at 32.
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In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,"10 the United States Supreme Court
held that state legislatures may constitutionally grant to courts the
power to establish rules of practice and procedure."' The test the
Court used to determine if a rule was "procedural" or "substantive"
was whether or not the rule actually regulated procedure." 2 In Roberts
v. Love"' the Arkansas Supreme Court defined "substantive" law as
"that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes punishment
therefor."" 4 Conversely, "procedural" law is "that which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who violates a criminal statute is
punished."' " 5
In Act 470 of 1971, the general assembly declared the Arkansas
Supreme Court to be the proper authority for prescribing rules of
pleading, practice, and procedure in criminal cases." 6 The general as-
sembly empowered the court to take the necessary steps to facilitate
the rules governing such proceedings throughout the courts in this
state." '7 In accordance with Act 470, the Arkansas Supreme Court and
the attorney general joined to create the Arkansas Criminal Code Revi-
sion Commission." 8 The Commission divided itself into two commit-
tees. The first committee revised the substantive criminal law, while the
second committee revised the rules of criminal procedure." 9 In Act 280
of 1975 the Arkansas General Assembly formally adopted the Arkan-
sas Criminal Code. 2 ° That same year, "pursuant to Act 470 of 1971
110. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
111. Id. at 9-10. Of course, the rules could not be inconsistent with other statutes or the
Constitution of the United States. Id.
112. Id. at 14. The Court defined "procedure" as the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of the law. Id.
113. 231 Ark. 886, 333 S.W.2d 897 (1960).
114. Id. at 892-93, 333 S.W.2d at 901.
115. Id.
116. Act of Apr. 1, 1971, No. 470, § 1, 1971 Ark. Acts 1126, (currently codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. §16-11-301 (Michie 1987)).
117. Act. 470 of 1971, § 6, 1971 Ark. Acts at 1127-28. The General Assembly declared
that an emergency existed which required passage of this Act to facilitate reform in the judicial
system to protect public health, peace, and safety. Id. See also Walter Cox & David Newbern,
New Civil Procedure: The Court That Came in From the Code, 33 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1979). In Act
38 of 1973, the general assembly granted the Arkansas Supreme Court the ability to prescribe
rules of procedure for civil cases throughout the state. Act of Jan. 31, 1973, No. 38, 1973 Ark.
Acts 89 (currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §16-11-302 (Michie 1987)).
118. In re The Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission, 259 Ark. 863, 530 S.W.2d
672 (1975) (per curiam).
119. Id. at 863, 530 S.W.2d at 673.
120. Id. Act of Mar. 3, 1975, No. 280, 1975 Ark. Acts 500 (currently codified at ARK.
19921
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and in harmony with the court's constitutional superintending control
over all trial courts," the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted and ap-
proved the proposed and amended rules of criminal procedure. 121
In a 1977 decision, Miller v. State,'22 the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected the argument that it did not have the inherent authority
to make rules of criminal procedure in the absence of an enabling stat-
ute. 23 The court stated that the enabling act passed by the legislature
did not confer upon the court an express rule-making power, but
merely recognized and was harmonious with the court's inherent power
to make rules governing procedure in the trial courts of Arkansas. 24 In
1979, the Arkansas General Assembly clarified its authority to grant to
the supreme court the power to make rules of practice and procedure
for the trial courts of Arkansas. 12  The legislature also stated that
granting this authority did not violate the separation of powers provi-
sion of the Arkansas Constitution.' 2 In Jennings v. State27 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in Miller that the general as-
sembly's delegation of authority to prescribe rules of criminal
procedure was not unconstitutional. 8 The enabling act merely recog-
nized the court's inherent authority to make rules and did not confer an
express power. 29
In an extended session of 1975, the Arkansas General Assembly
adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence for use in the courts of Arkan-
sas. ' In a 1986 decision, Ricarte v. State,'3' the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the Uniform Rules of Evidence were not validly
CODE ANN. § 5-1-101 (Michie 1987)).
121. 259 Ark. at 864, 530 S.W.2d at 673. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
122. 262 Ark. 223, 555 S.W.2d 563 (1977).
123. Id. at 226, 555 S.W.2d at 564.
124. Id. Thus, it did not violate the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches. Id.
125. Act of Mar. 9, 1979, No. 333, § 5, 1979 Ark. Acts 622, 624 (currently codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-301 (Michie 1987)).
126. Act 333 of 1979, § 5, 1979 Ark. Acts at 624. See also Act of Mar. 4, 1981, No. 312, §
2, 1981 Ark. Acts 534, 536 (currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-301 (Michie 1987)).
ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 2 provides: "No person, or collection of persons, being one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinaf-
ter expressly directed or permitted."
127. 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 363, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
128. Id. at 218, 633 S.W.2d at 373-74.
129. Id.
130. Act of Feb. 10, 1976, No. 1143, § 1, 1975 Ark. Acts 2799 (currently codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1987)).
131. 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986).
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adopted by the legislature since the legislature was not lawfully in ses-
sion at the time.13 In order to prevent this ruling from causing chaos in
the legal community, the court adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence
as the law in Arkansas in the same opinion. 133 In doing so, the court
noted that it was not the first court to adopt the Uniform Rules of
Evidence by judicial action. 34 In 1987, the Arkansas General Assem-
bly promptly responded to the Ricarte decision by passing House Bill
1893 which re-enacted the invalidated Act 1143 of 1975 in its en-
tirety."3 5 The Governor signed the bill and it became Act 876 of
1987.130
After the general assembly originally adopted the Uniform Rules
of Evidence in 1976 and before the Court in Ricarte ruled that adop-
tion unconstitutional in 1986, the general assembly enacted the Arkan-
sas child hearsay exception for sexual offenses against children under
ten years of age. 37 In St. Clair v. State'38 the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the general assembly's adoption of a child hearsay ex-
ception "deals with a matter our [current] rules [of evidence] do not
cover."' 39 The court then held that the child hearsay exception promul-
gated by the legislature, Rule 803(25)(A), was constitutional. 40
132. Id. at 103, 717 S.W.2d at 489. At the time of their adoption in January of 1976, the
legislature had unconstitutionally extended their session past the permitted 60 day period and had
no authority to pass amendments. See ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark.
156, 599 S.W.2d 375 (1980); Purcell v. Jones, 242 Ark. 168, 412 S.W.2d 284 (1967).
133. Ricarte, 290 Ark. at 104, 717 S.W.2d at 489. The court amended Rule 1102, thus
changing the name to read the "Arkansas Rules of Evidence." See In re Adoption of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 290 Ark. 616, 717 S.W.2d 491 (1986). The rules became effective on October
13, 1986. Id. The court had previously adopted the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure by judicial action. Ricarte, 290 Ark. at 105, 717 S.W.2d
at 490.
134. Ricarte, 290 Ark. at 105, 717 S.W.2d at 490. The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court had adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence pursuant to federal statutes which
were similar to Arkansas' statutes. Id. See Reporter's Note, 409 U.S. 1132 (1972).
135. Act of Apr. 13, 1987, No. 876, 1987 Ark. Acts 2096 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-41-101 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991)). Morton Gitelman, How the Arkansas Supreme Court
Raised the Dead, 1987 ARK. L. NOTES 93, 94 (1987). Act 876 of 1987, § 3 (emergency clause)
provides: "it is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that because of the case
Ricarte v. State, CR 86-31, a question has arisen over the validity of Act 1143 of the Extended
Session of 1976; that this act is a reenactment of the former law; and that the immediate passage
of this Act is necessary to clarify the state of the law on this issue."
136. Gitelman, supra note 135, at 94.
137. See Act of Mar. 18, 1985, No. 405, 1985 Ark. Acts 752 (original version codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Rule 803(25)) (Michie 1987).
138. 301 Ark. 223, 783 S.W.2d 835 (1990).
139. Id. at 225, 783 S.W.2d at 836.
140. Id.
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In Curtis v. State""1 the appellant argued that Arkansas' statute
permitting videotaped testimony of child victims of a sexual offense to
be admitted into evidence 42 was unconstitutional because it was proce-
dural in nature and was promulgated by the general assembly rather
than by the Arkansas Supreme Court." s In determining the scope of
the court's rule-making authority, the majority stated:
If the purpose of the rule is to permit a court to function effi-
ciently, the rule-making power [of the court] is supreme unless its
impact conflicts with a fixed public policy which has been legislatively
or constitutionally adopted and has at its basis something other than
court administration. . . . [U]ntil an area of practice or procedure is
preempted by rules of court, we will give full effect to legislation."",
In Lyons v. Forrest City Machine Works" 5 the Arkansas Supreme
Court again stated that it would give full effect to legislation in an area
of practice or procedure that the court had not preempted by rule." 6
Furthermore, the court stated it would defer to the general assembly
when a court rule conflicts with a public policy adopted by legislative
act or as part of the state constitution." 7 However, in State v.
Sypult" 8 the Arkansas Supreme Court backed away from its earlier
141. 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987).
143. 301 Ark. at 209-10, 783 S.W.2d at 48. In Curtis the majority stated that the supreme
court's rulemaking authority had three sources: "(1) inherent in the constitutional separation of
powers, (2) express constitutional grant, or (3) enabling legislation." Id. at 210, 783 S.W.2d at
48.
144. Id. at 212, 783 S.W.2d at 49.
145. 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220 (1990).
146. Id. at 563, 785 S.W.2d at 222. At issue in Lyons was the general assembly's change of
the wording in ARK. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (Time limit for service) from reading. "if service of summons
is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the compliant, the action shall be
dismissed" to read "may be dismissed." Id. (emphasis added). The wording of the rule was
changed in 1989. See Act of Mar. 8, 1989, No. 401, 1989 Ark. Acts 815 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-58-134 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991)). The court ruled that since it had preempted the
area of service of process, its version trumped the legislative version which gave the trial court
discretion. Lyons, 301 Ark. at 563, 785 S.W.2d at 222. In an even earlier act, the state legislature
believed that it could supersede rules made by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Act of Mar. 28,
1981, No. 900, 1981 Ark. Acts 2119 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-302 (Michie 1987)).
The court, however, simply ignored the statute, later promulgating a per curiam order to super-
sede it. Morton Gitelman & John J. Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the
Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 ARK. L. NOTES 27, 29 (1991).
147. Lyons, 301 Ark. at 563, 785 S.W.2d at 222. See also May v. Bob Hankins Distr. Co.,
301 Ark. 494, 785 S.W.2d 23 (1990) (stating that a rule of civil procedure supersedes a conflict-
ing statute if both cannot "stand together").
148. 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990).
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position of deference toward the general assembly.'49 Because legisla-
tion involving public policy matters would invariably conflict with court
rules, the court declared a new policy of deferring to the general assem-
bly only when "the conflicting court rule's primary purpose and effec-
tiveness are not compromised; otherwise, our rules remain supreme."' 50
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN VANN
In Vann v. State15 1 the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the
Arkansas Child Hearsay Statute enacted by the general assembly' 52
was unconstitutional because it violated the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 53 In so rul-
ing, the court reversed Vann's rape conviction and remanded for a new
trial.' 5' The majority of the court followed the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 55 holding that the Confron-
tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment'"6 requires that a hearsay state-
ment may be admitted into evidence at trial "only" if it bears "ade-
quate indicia of reliability."' 5 7 The court stated:
149. Id. at 7-9, 800 S.W.2d at 404-05. In Sypult the court held that ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
12-511(a) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989) conflicted with a pre-existing court rule. The statute
would have, in effect, abrogated the physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege in matters
involving child abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect of a child or the cause thereof. Id. at 6-8, 800
S.W.2d at 403-05.
150. Id. at 7, 800 S.W.2d at 404. Shortly after Sypult the court exhibited this authority by
issuing an order amending both a rule of evidence and procedure. In re Proposed Changes To the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure And the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, 304 Ark. 742, 799
S.W.2d 811 (1990) (per curiam).
151. 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992).
152. See supra note 9.
153. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127. See supra note 22; see generally Brian L.
Schwalb, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized Witnesses: Defining "Con-
frontation" To Protect Both Children and Defendants, 26 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 185 (1991);
Sharon Kennedy, Note, The Confrontation Clause Limits On the Admissibility of Hearsay Evi-
dence in Child Abuse Cases, 59 UMKC L. REV. 1093 (1991); Jan Sanders, Note, Protecting the
Child Victim of Sexual Abuse While Preserving the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Rights of
the Accused, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 495 (1991).
154. 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127. The court's constitutional ruling applies only to
an accused in a criminal trial and does not touch on the statute's validity in a civil case. Id.
155. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
156. See supra note 22.
157. Vann, 309 Ark. at 306, 831 S.W.2d at 127-28. Relying on Wright, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court also noted that hearsay statements not falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion" might meet Confrontation Clause standards of reliability if the out-of-court statement(s) are
supported by a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. In Wright the
United States Supreme Court identified four factors from various cases as illustrative of "guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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If the statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception, such as the "excited utterance," it is presumptively unrelia-
ble and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes. To fall
within the admissible category, the evidence must show "the declar-
ant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances
that the test for cross-examination would be of marginal utility."158
In ruling that Arkansas' child hearsay statute159 was unconstitu-
tional, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Vann compared the test for reli-
ability imposed by Rule 803(25) with the test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright.'60 As discussed in the
Wright decision, the Confrontation Clause requires that a hearsay
statement must contain "adequate indicia of reliability" showing that
"the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circum-
stances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility"
before the statement can be admitted.16 1 Conversely, Rule 803(25) pro-
vided that a child's statement was admissible after the trial court sim-
ply determined that the statement possessed a "reasonable likelihood of
trustworthiness.1162 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that
Rule 803(25) was unconstitutional and violated Vann's right of con-
frontation because it had a lower standard of admissibility than the
minimum required under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.' The court also stated that the introduction into evi-
dence of the child's statements to the mother and nurse under Rule
803(25) did not conflict with the Confrontation Clause because these
statements were also admissible under other, "firmly-rooted" hearsay
exceptions."' However, the court found that Rule 803(25), which was
unconstitutional, provided the only possible basis for the admissibility
of the policeman's hearsay testimony regarding the child's statements
to him. 6 '
In its appellate brief, the State acknowledged that the policeman's
hearsay testimony may have been erroneously admitted but contended
158. 309 Ark. at 306, 831 S.W.2d at 128 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149
(1990)).
159. See supra note 9.
160. 309 Ark. at 307-08, 831 S.W.2d at 128-29.
161. 309 Ark. at 307, 831 S.W.2d at 128 (quoting Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149).
162. 309 Ark. at 307, 831 S.W.2d at 128 (emphasis added). See supra note 9.
163. 309 Ark. at 307-08, 831 S.W.2d at 128-29.
164. Id. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 129. The firmly-rooted exceptions were for excited utter-
ances and statements made for purposes of medical treatment. See supra note 21.
165. 309 Ark. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 129.
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that the error was harmless because the "statements were supported by
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness even without consideration
of the corroborating evidence . . . ...*" In addressing this argument,
the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that Vann's appeal involved a fed-
eral, not a state, constitutional right. 6 ' The majority of the court ap-
plied the harmless error test articulated in Chapman v. California."
In Chapman the Court stated that "[t]he question [of whether or not
harmless error has occurred] is whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the convic-
• tion. ' "69 The Court held that before a violation of a federal constitu-
tional right can be held harmless, the reviewing court must find the
error "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."1 70
In Vann's case, the State had the burden of proving that sexual
intercourse occurred between Vann and the child. 71 On appeal, the
majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the police officer's
hearsay testimony about the child's statements was the only direct evi-
dence that sexual intercourse had occurred and that all other evidence
presented at trial was circumstantial. 172 Since the police officer's hear-
say testimony about penetration was only admissible under Rule
803(25) and did not qualify under any other hearsay exception, Vann's
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses was violated.7 a Be-
cause the policeman's "testimony was the only direct evidence of pene-
tration," it "might have contributed to the proof" of penetration at
trial. 17" Thus, the court rejected the State's harmless error argument,
concluding that the erroneously admitted hearsay testimony by the po-
166. Supplemental Brief and Abstract for Appelle at 10, Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831
S.W.2d 126 (1992) (No. CR 91-191).
167. 309 Ark. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 129.
168. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman the United States Supreme Court reversed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision to affirm a state criminal conviction even though the defendants'
federal constitutional rights had been violated based upon adverse comments made by the prosecu-
tion in relation to their failure to testify. Id. at 26. The California court ruled that even though
their federal constitutional rights were violated, the denial constituted "harmless error" under
California constitutional provisions dealing with harmless error. Id. at 20. In reversing, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that before an error involving the denial of a federal constitutional
right can be held harmless in a state criminal case, the reviewing court must be satisfied "beyond
a reasonable doubt" that the error did not contribute to the conviction. Id. at 24.
169. Vann, 309 Ark, at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 129 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, 23-24).
170. 309 Ark. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 129.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 130.
173. Id. at 308, 831 S.W.2d at 130.
174. Id. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 130.
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liceman was not "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.""'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Glaze, joined by Justice Hays,
agreed with the majority that the child's statements to her mother and
nurse might appropriately be introduced into evidence under the ex-
cited utterance and medical treatment hearsay exceptions. 76 The con-
currence also stated that the child's statements to the police officer
failed to qualify under any firmly-rooted hearsay exception or meet the
reliability factors listed in Idaho v. Wright.'7 In their concurrence in
the supplemental opinion in George v. State, 78 Justices Glaze and
Hays had urged the United States Supreme Court to retreat from the
position taken in Wright and allow trial courts to consider corrobora-
tive evidence when determining the trustworthiness of a child declar-
ant's out-of-court statements under a child hearsay exception.' How-
ever, both justices conceded that it was unlikely that the Court would
reconsider this point in the near future.' Although Justices Glaze and
Hays agreed with the dissent in Vann that sufficient evidence existed in
the record to uphold Vann's rape conviction, they believed that reversal
was still appropriate because the error of allowing the child's state-
ments to the policeman into evidence under Rule 803(25) was "prejudi-
cial."'' It is unclear from their opinion, however, which harmless error
test they were applying in determining that the statements were
prejudicial. 82
Justice Brown dissented from the majority opinion in Vann for two
reasons. First, he pointed out that the majority failed to clearly state
why the police officer's hearsay testimony was prejudicial.' 8 3 Second, he
opined that the introduction of the police officer's hearsay testimony
into evidence was harmless error.' 8 ' Justice Brown believed that the
child's statements to the police officer met the requirements for trust-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 311, 831 S.W.2d at 130 (Glaze, J., concurring).
177. Id. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
178. 306 Ark. 360, 818 S.W.2d 951 (1991).
179. Id. at 374D-E, 818 S.W.2d at 953.
180. Vann, 309 Ark. at 310, 831 S.W.2d at 130 (Glaze, J., concurring). This concession
was possibly the result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736
(1992) in which it again approved of the "trustworthiness" factors enunciated in Wright. See
supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 311, 831 S.W.2d at 130-31 (Glaze, J., concurring).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 312, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Brown, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
majority simply drew conclusions. Id.
184. Id.
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worthiness enunciated in Wright.18 He reasoned that the child's state-
ments were consistent with her previous statements to her mother and
to the hospital nurse; the child had no motive to fabricate a story
against Vann; and the child had no familiarity with terminology involv-
ing sexual matters. 86 He emphasized the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Wright that "the presence of corroborating evidence more ap-
propriately indicates that any error in admitting the statement might
be harmless, rather than that any basis exists for presuming the declar-
ant to be trustworthy."' 87 Justice Brown stated that since a considera-
ble amount of evidence was properly introduced to prove penetration,
even though it was circumstantial in nature, the error in admitting the
policeman's hearsay testimony was harmless. 88
In his dissent, Justice Brown also opined that the majority incor-
rectly relied on the United States Supreme Court's 1967 decision in
Chapman v. California" since the Court had subsequently declined to
apply that particular test for harniless error. 90 For example, in State v.
Larson,'9' a case factually similar to Vann, the Court denied certiorari,
allowing a harmless error ruling by the Minnesota Supreme Court to
stand. 92 Although the Court's denial of certiorari does not indicate
that it approved of the Larson decision, Larson does indicate that some
courts are using a "harmless-error" standard other than that articu-
lated by the Court in Chapman.'9' In Larson the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld a rape conviction where the hearsay testimony of a social
worker and a police officer concerning an abused child's statements was
erroneously admitted into evidence. 94 The court in Larson reasoned
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the tes-
timony was not prejudicial but only cumulative of the child's state-
ments to a physician's assistant, a child protection specialist, and a
clinical psychologist. 9 '
185. Id. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
186. Vann, 309 Ark. at 313, 831 S.W.2d at 132 (Brown, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 314, 831 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150-51
(1990)). "In making a harmless-error analysis, corroborative evidence of the crime itself is appro-
priately considered." Id.
188. 309 Ark. at 315-16, 831 S.W.2d at 133 (Brown, J., dissenting).
189. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
190. Vann, 309 Ark. at 312-13, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Brown, J., dissenting).
191. 472 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 965 (1992).
192. Vann, 309 Ark. at 313, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Brown, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 312-13, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Brown, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 313, 831 S.W.2d at 132 (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussing Larson).
195. Id.
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Instead of the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
enunciated in Chapman,1" Justice Brown looked to the standard used
in Coy v. Iowa.197 In Coy the United States Supreme Court stated:
"An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of
whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the
jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an in-
quiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must
therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence.91 98
Thus, based on the totality of all the evidence produced at trial, Justice
Brown would have affirmed Vann's conviction on the ground that the
police officer's hearsay testimony was harmless because it was cumula-
tive to other evidence properly introduced and because it was reliable
under the factors enunciated in Wright.199
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Vann is significant for
several reasons. Substantively, the court went much further than it had
gone in the supplemental opinion in George"'0 and invalidated Rule
803(25)201 in its entirety because the Rule's reliability standard was
lower than the minimum standard required by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 02
On its face, Rule 803(25) denied Vann his right of confrontation since
it provided that the hearsay statement of a child was admissible after
the trial court determined that the statement possessed only a "reason-
able likelihood of trustworthiness. '203 This standard was at odds with
the Confrontation Clause which "requires that the statement bear such
'adequate indicia of reliability' that 'the declarant's truthfulness is so
clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-exami-
nation would be of marginal utility.'"20 Because the policeman's
hearsay testimony was only admissible under Rule 803(25), and be-
196. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
197. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). See supra note 40.
198. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021-22 (emphasis added). See also Vann, 309 Ark. at 315, 831
S.W.2d at 133 (Brown, J., dissenting).
199. Vann, 309 Ark. at 315-16, 831 S.W.2d at 133 (Brown, J., dissenting).
200. 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792, rehg denied, 306 Ark. 360, 374-A, 818 S.W.2d 951
(1991).
201. See supra note 9.
202. Vann, 309 Ark. at 307-08, 831 S.W.2d at 128-29.
203. Id. at 307, 831 S.W.2d at 128 (quoting Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149).
204. Id. at 307-08, 831 S.W.2d at 128-29.
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cause Rule 803(25)'s admissibility standard did not meet the minimum
standard required by the Confrontation Clause, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that Vann's right of confrontation was violated.10 5
Procedurally, the manner in which the court in Vann reached its
decision was inconsistent with its policy of refusing to address issues
that are not properly raised on appeal. In reversing Vann's conviction,
the Arkansas Supreme Court went beyond the arguments made in the
briefs. Vann argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in admitting
the policeman's hearsay testimony about the child's statements because
it used corroborative evidence in deciding the statement's reliability. 06
Using corroborative evidence in admitting an unavailable child victim's
hearsay statements was found to violate a criminal defendant's right of
confrontation in Idaho v. Wright.2 0 7 At trial and in his appellate brief,
Vann did not argue that Rule 803(25) was unconstitutional in its
entirety.
On its own motion, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court looked
beyond Vann's narrow argument, ruling that Rule 803(25) was alto-
gether unconstitutional.20 8 In doing so, the court departed from its well-
settled and regularly-followed practice of refusing to entertain issues
not argued at trial and preserved for appeal. Prior to Vann, the court
had routinely held that when neither the abstract nor the record
showed the point to have been argued to the trial court, the appellate
court would not consider it on appeal.2 0 9 In this case, the court's expan-
sion of Vann's argument on appeal worked to his advantage. However,
in the overwhelming majority of other cases, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has been unwilling to expand, or even review, arguments not
made at trial or listed as error in the appellant's brief. In scores of
opinions, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that arguments may
not be raised for the first time on appeal.2 10
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in George v. State2 1 ' the
Arkansas Supreme Court, on its own motion, applied the factors enun-
205. Id.
206. Brief and Abstract for Appellant at 46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
207. 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990). See supra note 46.
208. Vann, 309 Ark. at 304, 831 S.W.2d at 127.
209. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 304 Ark. 514, 803 S.W.2d 546 (1991); Price v. State, 285
Ark. 148, 685 S.W.2d 506 (1985).
210. E.g., Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).
211. 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792, reh'g denied, 306 Ark. 360, 374-A 818 S.W.2d 951
(1991).
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ciated in Idaho v. Wright212 (which are not included in the Rule
803(25) criteria)213 in concluding that the hearsay statements intro-
duced at trial contained "sufficient guaranties of trustworthiness." '' In
reversing the conviction in Vann, however, the majority elected not to
apply the Wright factors on its own when deciding that the police of-
ficer's testimony violated Vann's right- of confrontation under Rule
803(25).213
The decision in Vann also raises the question, once again, of
whether the legislative branch or the judicial branch of the government
in Arkansas has the authority to promulgate evidentiary rules for the
courts in this state. In his concurring opinion, Justice Glaze, joined by
Justice Hays, stated that the general assembly should provide for the
court's evidentiary rules.21 6 They suggested that the majority's action
indicates a belief that Act 66 is unconstitutional. 17
In amending Rule 803(25) in Act 66, the legislature stated:
It is determined by the General Assembly that the United States' Su-
preme Court's decision in White v. Illinois, No. 90-6113 (S. Ct. Jan.
15, 1992) [112 S. Ct. 736 (1992)] foreclosed any rule requiring that
as a necessary antecedent to the introduction of hearsay testimony,
the prosecution must either produce the declarant at trial or show that
the declarant is unavailable.1 8
The general assembly's interpretation of the holding in White v.
Illinois, however, might be erroneous. In White, the Court held that a
trial court does not first have to make a finding of a declarant's "un-
availability" before admitting into evidence statements made under the
"spontaneous declaration ' 219 and "medical examination '220 exceptions
to the hearsay rule.221 The holding in White does not necessarily stand
212. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 9.
214. George, 306 Ark. 360, 366, 813 S.W.2d 792, 796 (1991).
215. See Vann, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992). The dissent pointed out that the
majority failed to state why the police officer's testimony was error under Rule 803(25). "Was this
because the circuit court failed to make a Rule 803(25) determination or because Rule 803(25) is
constitutionally infirm or because the [police officer] engaged in improper questioning or for some
other reason? The majority opinion leaves us in the dark." Id. at 315, 831 S.W.2d at 133 (Brown,
J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 312, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Glaze, J., concurring).
217. 309 Ark. at 311, 831 S.W.2d at 131 (Glaze, J. concurring).
218. Act 66 of 1992, § 5 (emergency clause) (emphasis added).
219. See supra note 21.
220. See supra note 21.
221. White, 112 S. Ct. at 739.
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for the proposition that the "unavailability" requirement is dispensed
with in all cases, as the general assembly stated in Act 66. The holding
could just as easily be interpreted as applying only to hearsay state-
ments admitted pursuant to the spontaneous declaration or medical ex-
amination exceptions to the hearsay rule. The question of whether a
showing of "unavailability" is required in cases involving sexual of-
fenses against children has not yet been addressed by the United States
Supreme Court. Thus, the general assembly's interpretation of the
holding in White, a function normally undertaken by the judicial
branch, might be in error. If so, this error was specifically incorporated
into the rule by the general assembly when it amended Rule 803(25) in
Act 66.222 Since the general assembly's interpretation of White argua-
bly expands upon the actual holding in that case, and might be errone-
ous, the scales tip in favor of the Arkansas Supreme Court over the
Arkansas General Assembly as the proper governmental branch to pro-
mulgate the rules of evidence.223
While the general assembly is not the proper governmental branch
to interpret statutory and case law, it is the proper branch to promul-
gate "substantive" law. The question now arises whether evidentiary
rules are substantive or procedural in nature. In State v. Sypult224 the
majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "deference to leg-
islation involving rules of evidence and procedure will be given only to
the extent the legislation is compatible with our established rules.
When conflicts arise which compromise these rules, our rules remain
supreme.''228 Before Sypult the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it
shared the rule-making power with the general assembly and that the
court would defer to the general assembly when legislation involving
matters of public policy conflicted with the court's rules.226 In Sypult
the majority concluded that its inherent authority to make rules of evi-
dence preempt any evidentiary law enacted by the general assembly,
even if that law was substantive. 22 7 The dissent believed this result ex-
ceeded the court's power.228
However, in his concurrence in Sypult, Justice Newbern stated
222. See Act 66 of 1992, § 5 (emergency clause).
223. See State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 9, 800 S.W.2d at 405.
226. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 212, 783 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1990).
227. Sypult, 304 Ark. at 15, 800 S.W.2d at 409.
228. Id. at 15, 800 S.W.2d 409 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
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that he viewed the court's decision in Ricarte v. State29 as holding that
the rules of evidence were rules of practice and procedure and were not
substantive law.2 80 In Sypult Justice Turner expanded on the eviden-
tiary rules versus the public policy issue that the majority opinion ad-
dressed. He stated that "matters of public policy enacted as laws by the
legislature involving substantive rights as distinguished from matters of
procedure will always be controlling .. . .1-2 This statement preserves
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine that courts are to inter-
pret law and legislatures are to enact law. In Vann the Arkansas Su-
preme Court did not specifically overrule Act 66.22 Because the three
new hearsay exceptions promulgated by the court are evidentiary and
not substantive in nature, the Arkansas Supreme Court's rules should
preempt Act 66.
Finally, the decision in Vann reveals that members of the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court disagree on the question of the proper standard to
apply in evaluating issues of harmless constitutional error. The harm-
less error doctrine in American jurisprudence is thought to have begun
with the case of Bram v. United States.3  Under the holding in Brain,
any constitutional errors committed in a criminal trial required auto-
matic reversal.2 3 ' In Chapman v. California,23 5 however, the Court
stated that "there may be some constitutional errors which in the set-
ting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. 23 6 Therefore, the
Chapman Court rejected the idea that violations of any federal consti-
tutional right required automatic reversal. 37 The Court stated that ap-
pellate courts may affirm a conviction if the reviewing court believed
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 38
Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has used four different
approaches in determining harmless error. In some cases, the Court has
229. 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986).
230. Sypult, 304 Ark. at 9, 800 S.W.2d at 405 (Newbern, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 13, 800 S.W.2d at 407 (Turner, J., concurring).
232. See supra note 96.
233. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59
VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
234. See I JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
235. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
236. Id. at 22.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 24.
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focused solely on the erroneously admitted evidence to decide whether
it contributed to the conviction.2 19 In others, the Court has examined
the record to decide whether the unconstitutionally admitted evidence
was "merely cumulative" of other overwhelming, untainted evidence. 40
In a third category of cases, the Court determined whether or not the
accuracy and reliability of the trial were such that the constitutional
infringement was of no consequence.2 41 Lastly, the Court has decided
the question of harmless error by determining whether overwhelming
evidence of guilt existed absent the constitutional error.242
In Vann the majority of the court applied the "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt ' 243 harmless error standard established in Chapman v. Cali-
fornia.2" The Court in Chapman articulated the test as "whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction." 245 The dissent in Vann selected the stan-
dard voiced in Coy v. Iowa2 46 that "harmlessness must therefore be
determined on the basis of the remaining evidence, ' 247 which is essen-
tially the same test that the Supreme Court applied in Harrington v.
California . 48 This test has been criticized, however, on the ground that
when an appellate court determines harmless error by reviewing the
record in search of the "remaining untainted evidence" to conclude
that the error did not contribute to the verdict, the court impermissibly
sits as an "appellate jury. '1249 This results in the denial of a defendant's
right to trial by jury, thus usurping the real jury's function.25 0
239. E.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
240. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
241. E.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
242. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). Since the Court has not expressly adopted
any one of these approaches, many possible dispositions are possible depending upon the approach
taken. For a discussion of these approaches and their inherent problems see David M. Skoglind,
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: An Analysis of Its Current Application, 33 BAYLOR L.
REV. 961 (1981).
243. Vann, 309 Ark. at 309, 831 S.W.2d at 129.
244. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
245. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
246. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
247. Id. at 1021-22. See also Vann, 309 Ark. at 315, 831 S.W.2d at 133 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
248. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). In Harrington the Court did not consider whether the error
might have contributed to the verdict, but looked only at the quantity of the remaining evidence
not introduced in error. Id. at 254.
249. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 429 (1980).
250. Id. at 431. Criticism of the Court's expansive use of harmless error is increasing. See
Roy Antley, Note, Rose v. Clark: Unconstitutional Presumptions in Criminal Trials May Be
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Because multiple standards currently exist for determining harm-
less error, it is apparent that appellate courts will be divided on the
proper standard to apply. Apparent also is the fact that attorneys in
Arkansas cannot predict when the Arkansas Supreme Court will render
decisions based upon issues not raised on appeal. By promulgating
three new child hearsay exceptions, but at the same time declining to
invalidate the general assembly's amended child hearsay exception, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has left intact two versions of a child hearsay
exception for use in sexual abuse cases. By not even mentioning Act 66,
it might appear as if the Arkansas Supreme Court intends to be the
sole governmental branch responsible for promulgating evidentiary
rules. The confusion facing the legal community in Arkansas as to
which child hearsay exception controls is obvious. How the legislature
will respond to this problem is a different matter.
Gregory Clay Sandefur
Harmless Error, 25 Hous. L. REv. 203 (1988).
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